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Abstract
This paper studies the design of optimal monetary policy rules for emerging
economies confronted to sharp capital out￿ows and speculative attacks. We
extend Taylor type monetary policy rules by allowing the central bank to give
some weight to the level of precautionary foreign reserve balances as one of
its targets. We show that a currency crisis scenario can easily occur when the
weight is zero, and that it can be avoided when the weight is positive. The
impacts of the central bank’s monetary control on the output level, the in￿a-
tion rate, the exchange rate, and the foreign reserve level are investigated as
well. By applying both the Hamiltonian as well as the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) equation (the latter leading to a dynamic programming formulation of
the problem), we can explore safe domains of attractions in a variety of compli-
cated model variants. Given the uncertainties the central banks faces, we also
show of how central banks can enlarge safe domains of attraction.
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11 Introduction
As pointed out for example in the recent IMF World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2009,
p.79￿) and by Aslund (2009), numerous Central and East European (CEE) countries
have been particularly a￿ected by the global economic crisis originated in the U.S.
market for subprime housing loans. As it was for example the case in the 1997/98
East Asian crisis, in recent times many Central and Eastern European countries
have su￿ered from signi￿cant rises in their country risk premia, sharp capital out-
￿ows and an increased nominal exchange rate volatility which have made once again
particularly clear the fragility of emerging market economies to external shocks.
The potential macroeconomic consequences of such developments are well-known
from the numerous currency and ￿nancial crises which have occurred in the last
decades: As discussed e.g. by Radelet and Sachs (2000), and Frankel (2005), the oc-
currence of large currency depreciations in countries with a large share of unhedged
foreign currency-denominated liabilities (such as the majority of East Asian crisis
before the 1997/98 crisis and as it is currently also the case of many of the Central
and East European economies) involved disastrous consequences for the macroeco-
nomic performance of those countries due to the sharp deterioration of the balance
sheets of the domestic sectors, the activation of credit constraints by the foreign and
domestic ￿nancial sectors and the subsequent credit crunch and the partial collapse
of aggregate investment.1
Against the background of the sharp capital out￿ows and increase exchange rate
volatility experienced by CEE countries in the recent months, the e￿ectiveness of
large foreign currency reserves held by the domestic monetary authorities as a bu￿er
instrument against potential currency runs has become once again particularly rele-
vant: Indeed, as discussed for example by Aizenman and Marion (2003), Aizenman
and Lee (2007) and Mendoza (2007), following especially the 1997/98 East Asian
crisis, many emerging economies engaged in a remarkable buildup of precautionary
international reserves, despite of the signi￿cant costs that such large liquidity bu￿ers
represent (Rodrik, 2006) ￿ see Levy-Yeyati (2008) for an alternative view in this
respect ￿. As pointed out e.g. by Feldstein (1999, p.93), such a strategy seems
rational since liquidity ￿is the key to self-protection: A country that has substantial
international liquidity ￿ large foreign exchange reserves and a ready source of foreign
1See Krugman (2000), Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001, 2004) and Flaschel and Semmler
(2006) for theoretical models that relate the Bernanke and Gertler (1995) balance sheet e￿ect with
the liability dollarization phenomenon.
2currency loans ￿ is less likely to be the object of a currency attack. Substantial
liquidity also permits a country that is attacked from within or without to defend
itself better and to make more orderly adjustments.￿ Indeed, given that an IMF
bailout cannot be taken for certain and that the concerned economies might be shut
out from additional lines of credit during episodes of currency runs, a su￿ciently
large precautionary stock of foreign currency reserves might be vital for a successful
defense of the domestic currency.2
Besides from the large body of literature based on the seminal papers by seminal
papers by Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984), in recent times new studies
have delivered important additional insights on the rationale a buildup of precau-
tionary foreign currency reserves. Aizenman and Turnovsky (2002) for example show
that su￿cient international reserves of a country that is an extensive international
borrower can serve as a collateral for creditors who want to secure international
loans. Thereafter, the increase of reserves in heavily borrowing countries reduces
default risk and may raise the welfare of both the high income lending countries as
well as the emerging market economies. Aizenman and Marion (2004) in turn inves-
tigate the role of political factors in the demand for international reserves and the
level of external borrowing. Arifovic and Maschek (2006), building on Arifovic and
Masson (2004), investigate the role of minimum reserves holdings for the occurrence
of currency crises in a model with heterogeneous beliefs and learning. In contrast,
Caballero and Panageas (2007) compare the e￿ciency of the accumulation of inter-
national with other hedging strategies in a global equilibrium model of sudden stops,
Jeanne and RanciŁre (2006, 2009), derive optimal levels of precautionary reserves
using a representative agent model where the agent has the possibility to enter into
a ￿reserve insurance contract￿ with foreign investors.
In contrast, the contribution of this paper to the literature relies in the analysis
of optimal monetary policy rules within a stylized macroeconomic framework of a
2An alternative view concerning the signi￿cant accumulation of foreign currency reserves by
emerging economies is that such a development re￿ects a mercantilist behavior of such economies.
Aizenman and Lee (2007) compare empirically the importance of precautionary versus mercantilist
motivations for reserve holding using data for a sample of 49 industrialized and developing countries
during the period 1980 ￿ 2000, ￿nding that a) variables associated with mercantilist motivations
(e.g. export growth, trade openness, etc.) are statistically signi￿cant but they account for a
very small part of total reserve accumulation, b) that reserve holding is strengthened signi￿cantly
by more liberal capital accounts, and c) that variables related to precautionary motivations (e.g.
capital account openness, crisis dummies, etc.) are both statistically and economically signi￿cant
in explaining reserve holding trends.
3small open emerging economy prone to speculative attacks and sudden capital out-
￿ows. As it will be discussed below, in our model the sole anticipation of a domestic
currency depreciation can lead to a sharp capital out￿ow (which in turn decreases
the foreign reserves of the domestic central bank). This, in turn, may trigger a run
on the domestic currency caused by the market participant’s fear of a termination
of the currency conversion. Since a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency
gives further incentives to foreign investors to pull their funds out of the country
as quickly as possible, their expectations become self-ful￿lling and a currency crisis
occurs, as discussed in Krugman (1979). By incorporating a reserves target into an
otherwise standard linear-quadratic monetary control problem, we study the ability
of the so-designed monetary policy to diminish the country’s vulnerability to specu-
lative attacks and sharp capital out￿ows which arises when the monetary authorities
acknowledge and incorporate the external ￿nancial fragility of their economy in their
decisions.
In solving our model variants we apply both the Hamiltonian as well as the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation leading to a dynamic programming algo-
rithm. With these methods we can explore the question what policies may allow an
increase of the safe domains of attraction so that the economy is less vulnerable to
currency shocks. As we will show, the resulting build-up of large stockpiles of for-
eign currency reserves is an advantageous result of such a monetary policy strategy,
since these might forestall ￿ or at least weather ￿ runs on the domestic currency. In
this line of reasoning, adequate monetary and foreign currency reserve policies might
indeed lower the likeliness of a currency run due to self-ful￿lling expectations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the theoretical
framework is discussed. In section 3 we explore by means of numerical simulations
the stabilization e￿ects of monetary policy when the domestic central bank includes
a term of reserves targeting in its loss function. Section 4 draws some concluding
remarks from this study.
42 The Theoretical Framework
The small open economy prone to speculative attacks is assumed to be represented
by the following macroeconomic relationships:
y = co ¡ ®yr(i ¡ ¼e) + X(ee); X0(ee) > 0 (1)
¼ = ¯¼y(y ¡ yn) + ¼e (2)
_ ee = i ¡ if ¡ Ã(i ¡ if;R); @Ã=@(i ¡ if) > 0; @Ã=@R < 0; (3)
where ee is the log expected exchange rate of domestic for foreign currency. An
increase in ee means an anticipation of depreciation of the domestic currency. Eq.(1)
represents a standard IS relationship where the real interest rate i ¡ ¼e a￿ects neg-
atively the ￿rm’s investment decisions, co and ®yr being positive constants.3 With
X(ee) we characterize the net exports which are assumed to react positively to the
depreciation of the expected exchange rate. Eq.(2) is a standard Phillips curve ac-
cording to which the domestic in￿ation rate ¼ is explained by the deviation of y from
the natural output (or NAIRU) level yn and an expected in￿ation term ¼e (which
in our most simplest variant will be presumed to be constant).4 For simplicity, we
assume that the policy maker sets y¤ = yn.
Finally, eq.(3) represents an extended interest rate parity condition, which is
assumed to consist of two factors: the standard Uncovered Interest Rate Parity
(where i is the domestic riskless rate and if is the foreign riskless rate), and Ã, a risk
premium term assumed to comprise the exchange rate- as well as the country risk.5
Concerning the former, since high interest rate di￿erentials are usually associated
with a high exchange rate volatility and therefore with a high exchange rate risk, we
use i ¡ if as a proxy for the exchange rate risk. Concerning the latter, because the
domestic central bank’s foreign reserve holdings are commonly acknowledged as one
of the key factors that a￿ects market’s perception of country risk, precisely R is the
second term in the risk premium term Ã.
3In our IS equation (2) we have neglected the negative exchange rate e￿ect on investment in-
corporated in Krugman (2000), Flaschel and Semmler (2006) and Proaæo, Flaschel and Semmler
(2008) in presence of the liability dollarization phenomenon. In order to simplify matters, in our
context, we revert back to a traditional IS equation, de￿ning output by a static and not by a
dynamic equation.
4Note that in this current version of the Phillips-curve we neglect an open economy component
and therefore possible direct exchange rate pass-through e￿ects as done for example in Ball (1999).
5For details of such risk premium, see Evans and Lyons (2005).
5The currency reserves dynamics in our model are described by
_ R = X(ee) + F(ee;R) @F=@ee < 0; @F=@R > 0 (4)
where
F(ee;R) = n(ee) ¡ z(ee;R) @z=@ee > 0; @z=@R < 0 (5)
As formulated in eq.(4), there are two sources of foreign currency reserves: the net
export of goods and services (represented by X(ee)) and the net in￿ow of ￿nancial
funds, represented by F(ee;R). Eq.(5) shows that the net in￿ow of ￿nancial funds
is equal to the in￿ow n minus the out￿ow z.6 While n is a function of ee only, z is
a function of two factors: ee and R. The reason why investors give weight to foreign
reserves in their decision of pulling their funds out is somewhat related to investors’
psychology. Since they understand that a serious shortage of foreign reserves may
bring about a panic caused by the fear of a rapid depreciation of the currency,
foreign investors will show a more sensitive reaction, in case of lower reserves, to
an anticipated depreciation of the domestic currency. In short, eq.(5) tells us that
investors’ reaction is state-dependent.
Concerning monetary policy, we assume that the domestic central bank has three
target variables: the in￿ation rate, the output level and a precautionary level of
foreign currency reserves. As previously discussed, by building up the precautionary
international reserve holdings, central banks keep the ability to defend their currency
value and avoid a currency crisis scenario (we assume that these variables can be
indirectly a￿ected by the central bank through controlling the short-term nominal
interest rate).
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where ¼ represents the in￿ation rate, y the output level, R, the stock of foreign
currency reserves and ¼¤, y¤ and R¤ the respective target levels. The weights ¸1
and ¸2 and ¸3 measure the relative importance of the three target variables in the
central bank’s objective function.
6In the short-run, the out￿ow and the in￿ow of the foreign currency due to ￿nancial investments
depends on the di￿erence of the domestic and the rest of the world’s interest rates and the expected
exchange rate. Here we neglect the di￿erence in the interest rates and assume the in￿ow to be
constant. Those simple assumptions allow us to highlight the mechanism of the currency crises
resulting from the investors speculative behavior.
6By inserting eqs. (1) and (2) in eq.(6), the problem for the domestic monetary





















subject to eqs. (3) and (4) and the boundary conditions for ee and R.








(i ¡ if)2 (8)
where the ￿rst term is country risk associated with a currency run and the second
term is exchange rate risk driven by the volatility of the interest rate di￿erentials.
The terms ¾1 and ¾2 are constant coe￿cients.
In the same sense, we de￿ne the net exports function as
X(ee) = "ee ¡ m (9)
where " represents the elasticity of exports to a change in the exchange rate, and
m represents the autonomous import level. Respecting the net in￿ow of ￿nancial
funds, we assume the following functional form:






where º and ¹ are constant coe￿cients.

































7with the corresponding ￿rst-order conditions
@H
@i
= ¡¸1®yr¯¼y(¼e ¡ ¼¤) ¡ ®yr(¸1¯2
¼y + ¸2)(co ¡ ®yr(i ¡ ¼e) + "ee ¡ m ¡ y¤)
+q1(1 ¡ ¾2(i ¡ if)) = 0 (12)
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R2q1 (14)
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From eq.(12), we obtain
q1 =
¸1®yr¯¼y(¼e ¡ ¼¤) + ®yr(¸1¯2
¼y + ¸2)(co ¡ ®yr(i ¡ ¼e) + "ee ¡ m ¡ y¤)
1 ¡ ¾2(i ¡ if)
: (17)
Incorporating (17) into (13), (15), (16), and (14) and solving _ q1 = _ q2 = _ ee = _ R =
0 for i, ee, R, and q2 gives a new set of steady states.
Next, we discuss some numerical results from our theoretical model.
3 Numerical Analysis
3.1 Monetary Policy without Foreign Reserves Control
In order to highlight the importance of the targeting of the foreign currency reserves
for dynamics of the analyzed small open economy, we begin by presuming that the
domestic monetary authority does not attempt to control the foreign reserves but
only aims at controlling the in￿ation rate and output through steering the interest
rate. In the next numerical example we set thus ¸3 = 0 (the relative weight of the
reserves targeting term in the loss function of the domestic central bank).
Note that in this ￿rst example (Table 1 shows the corresponding parameter val-
ues) we set ¾1 = 0 and ¾2 = 0 (and therefore Ã = 0), meaning that there is no risk
premium for the asset holding in the domestic currency. Yet, we have introduced
with º > 0, ¹ > 0, an e￿ect on foreign exchange reserves triggered by the level of
exchange rates and the level of reserves. Note that we here also presume the most
8simplest variant where, as in the output determination of eq.(1) and the Phillips-
curve of eq.(2) the expected in￿ation rate, ¼e, is a constant. We for convenience also
take m = 0.
Table 1: Parameter values: No Foreign Reserves Targeting, Ã = 0
¸1 ¸2 ¸3 ¼¤ ¼e y¤ R¤ if r
1 1 0 .03 .03 10 .00 .05 .02
® ®yr ¯¼y ¾1 ¾2 " m º ¹
5 1 .01 .00 .00 1 .00 100 10
Under the parameters of Table 1 there exists a unique steady state, which values
for the reserves R, interest rate, i, the exchange rate, e, output y, and the in￿ation
rate, ¼, are shown in Table 2.7
Table 2: Steady State Values: No Foreign Reserves Targeting, Ã = 0
Steady State R i e y ¼
1 10.104 0.05 5.02 10 0.03
The dynamics about the steady state of the state variables R and e are computed
using a dynamic programming algorithm as applied to dynamic economic problems
in Gr￿ne and Semmler (2004). Figure 1 shows the value function about the unique
steady state.
Figure 1 shows that there is a deep valley of the value function about the steady
state demonstrating that the value function indeed achieves a minimum about the
steady state values in the vicinity of the steady state R¤ = 10:104 and e¤ = 5:02.
The vector ￿eld for the solution of the dynamic programming problem described
by eqs.(12) ￿ (14), represented by the state equations (15) and (16), illustrates the
dynamics about the steady state. As can be observed from the trajectories all tra-
jectories move toward the unique steady state R, e in the vicinity of the steady state.
Thus, all currency reserves, displaced by a shock from the steady ￿ but with initial
conditions in the region between zero and the steady state R in the deep valley ￿ will
7We computed the steady state for the above parameter values, using eqs. (13)￿(17), employing
the software package Mathematica. The eigenvalues obtained from the 4D system in q1;q2;e;R at
this unique steady state are {2.46829, -2.44829, 1.0, -0.989899}. The steady state is thus a saddle
point in terms of state and co-state variables. It is, however, a general mathematical result, that a
saddle point in the state-costate space corresponds to a stable point in the state space dynamics of
a HJB-equation.
9Figure 1: Value function about the unique steady state and vector ￿eld, Case 1
safely move back to the steady state R. Yet, shocks that move the initial conditions
beyond that region will, as Figure 1 shows, lead to a divergence of the currency
reserves, R, and the exchange rate e.8
We now set ¾1 = 0:3, thus permitting the function Ã > 0 due to a risk premium
arising from low currency reserves (we thus again refer to the simple variant just
discussed). The other parameters remain the same as in Table 1, and we still keep
¾2 = 0.
As Table 3 makes clear, due to the introduction of a risk premium ¾1 > 0,
multiple steady state equilibria arise.9
Table 3: Multiple steady states: No Foreign Reserves Targeting, ¾1 = 0:3; ¾2 =
0; Ã > 0
Steady State R i e y ¼
1 10.257 0.079 5.049 10.000 0.030
2 0.519 0.627 1.7497 6.150 -0.008
3 -0.051 -5.773 -0.803 10.000 0.030
4 -0.519 -0.527 -1.749 3.800 -0.031
8Numerical Simulations using the actual in￿ation rate ¼ instead of ¼
e = constant delivered quite
similar results, see Kato and Semmler (2005). Since neither the shape of the value function nor the
dynamics signi￿cantly changed, we subsequently work with this simpler variant.
9The eigenvalues obtained from the 4D system in q1;q2;e;R at each steady state (from SS1 to
SS4) are: {-2.43215, 2.3969, 1.02606, -0.960707}, {-114.343, 112.387, 0.992782 + 2.75418 i, 0.992782
- 2.75418 i}, {-114.246, 112.286, 4.84355, -2.85307}, {-2453.37, 2409.97, 22.8586, 20.574}. Note that
SS(1) is stable, SS(2) is unstable, SS(3) is stable and SS(4) again unstable.
10Note that the highest steady state is almost the same as in Table 2 for the
￿rst example (with ¾1 = 0, ¾2 = 0), yet in this second analyzed case there are
three additional steady states arising, with of them featuring a negative R (this case
should be interpreted as a situation where the country may have to obtain a credit
line on external reserves for example from the IMF in order to serve its liabilities).
Overall, due to country risk (¾1 > 0) the domain of attraction of the steady state
R = 10:257 has slightly decreased, since a new unstable positive steady state has
emerged at R = 0:519. Now, due to the fact that there is a state dependent risk
premium, Ã > 0, shocks may produce a more vulnerable situation for the country’s
currency reserves.10
In the following case we permit both ¾1 > 0, ¾2 > 0, employing still the param-
eters as shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Parameters values: No Foreign Reserves Targeting, Ã > 0 (¾1 > 0; ¾2 > 0)
¸1 ¸2 ¸3 ¼¤ ¼e y¤ R¤ if r
1 1 10 .03 .03 10 .00 .05 .02
® ®yr ¯¼y ¾1 ¾2 " m º ¹
5 1 .01 2 2 1 .00 100 10
As in the previous case, we also obtain in this numerical example (where the risk
premium rises due to both exchange and the country risk e￿ects) multiple steady
states. We have left aside the detailed exploration of the number of steady state
equilibria but explore instead, using dynamic programming, in what direction the
largest steady state moves.
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the required equilibrium reserves in this case are up-
ward shifting when the home country’s risk premium is rising due to ¾1 > 0 and
¾2 > 0. This shows that with small risk premia the required reserves will be small,
but the region of stability is also small. Yet, with larger risk premia, the required
foreign currency reserves rise (although the region of a stable domain may rise too).
But as we will show below, the region of a stable domain will rise even much more if
currency reserve targeting is directly included in the objective function of the central
bank.
10Note that a large negative Ã, due to a negative R, an external credit line of a country, might
not be very reasonable, so one may disregard the steady with a negative R or constrain the Ã by a
lower bound.
11Figure 2: Minimum of the value function moves up (equilibrium R is rising) and
vector ￿eld pointing upward
3.2 Monetary Policy with Foreign Reserves Control
As Table 5, we now assume that the domestic monetary authorities pursue also an
exogenously determined foreign currency reserves target R¤ (as originally formulated
in eq.(6)) besides the standard in￿ation and output gap targets.
Table 5: Parameters Values: Foreign Reserves Targeting, Ã = 0
¸1 ¸2 ¸3 ¼¤ ¼e y¤ R¤ if r
1 1 10 .03 .03 10 100 .05 .02
® ®yr ¯¼y ¾1 ¾2 " m º ¹
5 1 .01 .00 .00 1 .00 100 10
As Table 6 makes clear, the introduction of ¸3 > 0 (and therefore R¤) into the
linear quadratic monetary control problem given by eq.(7) does not prevent the arise
of multiple steady states.11
Figure 3 depicts the value function about the high steady state characterized by
R = 100:042 and e = 14:659.
Figure 3 illustrates some important insights: In the ￿rst place, compared with
11The eigenvalues obtained from the 4D system in q1;q2;e;R at each steady state (from SS1 to SS3)





6, 0.00 + 8.7866 i, 0.00 - 8.7866 i}. Note that no reference
on the stability properties of the equilibria can be made when the real parts of the eigenvalues are
zero. Dynamic programming has to be used instead.
12Table 6: Steady State Values, Foreign Reserves Targeting, Ã = 0
Steady State R i e y ¼
1 100.042 .050 14.659 19.639 0.126
2 0.0002 .0500 0.127 5.107 -0.018
3 -0.0002 .050 -0.130 4.849 -0.021
Figure 3: Value function and vector ￿eld about high steady state
the case illustrated in Figure 2, in the reserves targeting case depicted in Figure 3
the minimum of the value function lies again in a deep valley, what clearly shows the
stronger attraction of the high steady state. This is the case despite that the required
reserves level R¤ is assumed to be very high and that the introduced ¸3 = 10 implies
a strong reaction of the monetary authority to the deviation of foreign reserves to
its target. This is purposely undertaken in order to obtain distinct and clearly
separated steady states. This ￿gure shows there are converging dynamics toward
the high steady state which is indicated by the arrows, thus the highest steady state
SS(1) is an attractor. Thus, as we can observe from Table 6 and Figure 3, when
the central bank targets a currency reserve level, the distance between the lower
(unstable) steady of R (roughly zero) and the high steady state of R (roughly 100)
increases signi￿cantly, what means that the domain of attraction is enlarged to an
important extent. We can also observe from Table 6 that the steady state output
for the high level steady state of R is much higher than for the lower one. In other
words, as compared to the case when the central bank does not target the currency
reserves, in the case above when the central bank does target the reserves a much
larger domain of attraction emerges.
13As next, we employ again the parameters reported in Table 5 for the previous
example, but assume additionally ¾1 = 0:3, and ¾2 = 0. There is now a risk premium
term Ã > 0 responding to low currency reserves.
Table 7: Steady State Values, Foreign Reserves Targeting, ¾1 = 0:3, ¾2 = 0, Ã > 0
Steady State R i e y ¼
1 100.042 0.053 14.659 19.636 0.126
2 -0.032 -9.229 -0.687 13.572 0.065
As shown in Table 7 this time due to the introduction of the risk premium, arising
from ¾1 = 0:3, the unstable steady state has moved down into the negative region
and only two steady states are detectable.12 However, the upper steady state (SS1)
remains the same as in the previous case. We thus do not expect, when employing
the dynamic programming algorithm, di￿erent results in the local stability properties
and the local behavior of the value function. We thus can by-pass a detailed dynamic
programming study for this variant. Overall, even in this case of the existence of
a state dependent risk premium, a large stable domain of attraction exists and the
economy is more likely to escape a currency crisis scenario when currency shocks
occur.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have investigated, by means of an extended linear quadratic mon-
etary policy control problem, the rationale of a foreign currency reserves target in
a macroecononomic environment where the central bank is confronted to the oc-
currence of sharp capital out￿ows, speculative attacks on its domestic currency and
foreign investors’ state-dependent reactions and self-ful￿lling expectations. We have
focused on two factors: ¸3, the weight that the central bank gives to the level of pre-
cautionary foreign reserve balances, and Ã, the risk premium term in the extended in-
terest rate parity condition, which represented the foreign investors’ state-dependent
12The eigenvalues obtained from the 4D system in q1;q2;e;R at each steady state (from SS1 to
SS2) are: {3.27182, -3.25075, 0.00 + 3.14645 i, 0.00 - 3.14645 i}, {-4561.26, 4480.39, 40.4486 +
35.3196 i, 40.4486 - 35.3196 i} The latter case shows instability, but again no inference can be made
for the case of zero real roots. Yet the dynamic programming result showed, as for the case of Table
6 (depicted in Figure 3) that the upper equilibrium is stable.
14reactions which is likely to fuel currency runs.
In the standard monetary policy model ￿rstly analyzed, the central bank pursued
only two targets, the output level and the in￿ation rate. With a state dependent
risk premium term (Ã > 0), multiple steady states arose, two domains of attraction
appeared in a positive state space and the safe domain of attraction shrank. While
the upper steady state (a saddle point) was close to the unique steady state obtained
when Ã = 0, the lower steady state (an unstable focus) occurred at a low reserve level,
indicating that the lower steady state was unstable in the state space. Therefore, the
lower steady state divided the positive state space into two domains: an upper stabile
and a lower unstable domain, where the trajectories moved downward, reducing the
stable domain of attraction. Since the lower steady state level of R moved up when
the risk premium factor was high, it suggests that a higher Ã enlarges the domain
of attraction of the lower steady state. In economic terms, such a situation may be
re￿ected by continuously falling levels of foreign currency reserves, persistently high
interest rates and the eventual occurrence of a currency crisis which may (jointly
with the high interest rates) lead the economy to a economic recession and a period
of de￿ation (see e.g. Christiano, Gust and Roldos (2004) and Proaæo et al. (2008)
for a study of such monetary policy e￿ects in currency crisis episodes).
In the alternative scenario, the central bank targeted also the level of precaution-
ary foreign reserves. In this case, when the risk premium factor was zero, multiple
steady states arose and thus two domains of attraction appeared in a positive state
space. Since the lower steady state was close to zero and the upper steady state of
R was very high and close to the target reserve level, there was a low probability of
a currency crisis. The lower steady state moved even closer to zero when the cen-
tral bank gave higher weight to the level of precautionary foreign reserve balances,
which means that the domain of attraction of the upper steady state enlarges as ¸3
increases. The central bank’s actual reserve level tends to be as large as the central
bank’s desired target level. Such a strategy could avoid the currency crisis scenario
even when the risk premium factor Ã > 0 was introduced, since there was a unique
steady state in a positive state space, and the steady state of R remained close to
the central bank’s target level. Thus, in this second scenario, as compared to the
￿rst one where the central bank does not target the reserve level, a much larger safe
region of attraction between the upper and lower steady states emerges.
Overall, we may conclude that if the central bank takes the level of precautionary
foreign reserve balances into account as one of its targets, it is possible to avoid the
economy ￿ipping into a currency crisis scenario. Given the usual uncertainty that
15central banks face in terms of the data of the country, the underlying model and its
parameters, the domains of bad outcomes and the size of shocks, this appears as a
very useful strategy for central banks to follow in order to increase such domains of
attraction decrease the probability of a currency run on their domestic currencies.
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